I. Introduction
Big cities feature more congestion, pollution and crime than smaller cities (Glaeser 1998, Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999) . These non-market local public bads can significantly reduce quality of life in big cities (Tolley 1974, Gyourko and Tracy 1991) .
In contrast, larger cities offer greater cultural and restaurant amenities than smaller cities.
Big cities facilitate restaurant and store specialization because such niche businesses anticipate that aggregate demand for their services will be high enough to cover their fixed costs (Waldfogel 2007 ).
This suggests that big cities offer a quality of life tradeoff. Their market consumer goods and services span a larger set of varieties than smaller cities but big cities have worse levels of non-market local public goods than smaller cities. These marketable consumer amenities and non-market local public goods are likely to be complements.
Metropolitan areas that make progress with respect to congestion, pollution and crime have a better opportunity to compete as "consumer cities" (Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz 2001) . This paper examines trends in three key indicators of urban quality of life; namely congestion, pollution and crime. I use several data sets to document two main facts. At a point in time, suburbanites face longer commutes, but are exposed to less pollution and crime than urban residents. Over time, suburban residents have enjoyed commute time reductions as employment has decentralized. Cities where employment has decentralization can absorb more growth without experiencing local quality of life degradation. As major metropolitan areas experience improvements in congestion, pollution and crime an incidence issue arises. At the end of the paper, I will examine the distributional effects of who gains from improvements in local quality of life in an openeconomy featuring migration both within cities and across cities and more stringent housing supply regulation in some of the most desirable cities.
II. The Cost of City Bigness Revisited
The key parameters determining the cost of urban growth can be highlighted with a simple linear pollution example. Consider a city of size N identical people. When an extra person moves to the city, he creates E extra units of pollution. Each entrant has no incentive to internalize the social costs he imposes on everyone else in the city. Each person in the city suffers D extra units of health damage from each extra unit of pollution.
Each person is willing to pay $W to avoid a unit of health damage (D) . In this case, aggregate damage caused by this entrant equals N*E*D*W. As the city's population and income grows, N and W will grow and the cost of urban growth could be large.
This economy abstracts from several real world features of cities that help to reduce the cost of city bigness. First, local public bad levels vary within cities. Within a city, there are pollution, crime and congestion hot spots. As I will document below, pollution levels are higher closer to the dense city center. As more people live and work in the suburbs, a smaller share of the population will be exposed to the highest pollution levels. Second, the population differs with respect to their disutility from disamenity exposure. Those who suffer relatively little from pollution, crime and congestion have a comparative advantage at living close to "ground zero" and renting the relatively cheap housing. Those who are risk averse, susceptible to pollution effects or have a high disutility from being stuck in traffic can minimize their exposure by paying a housing price premium to live in a nicer part of the city. The opportunity for heterogeneous households to Tiebout sort within major cities reduces the cost of city bigness.
The cost of city bigness literature implicitly assumes that people face high migration costs across cities. Such high migration costs mean that people cannot protect themselves by "voting with their feet" if a city's quality of life is degraded. If all residents are renters and face zero migration costs then they will not bear the incidence of unexpected negative shocks to quality of life.
III. New Facts on Three Costs of Urban Growth

Commuting
This section presents new facts about urban commuting patterns. I focus on three In this section, I use several data sets to investigate how commute times vary within cities and across cities. To begin to present some new commuting facts, I use micro data from the 2001 National Household Transportation Survey. This survey samples people from over 73 major metro areas. An attractive feature of this data is that it is possible to obtain residential zipcode identifiers. Table One reports three sets of regressions using this sample of metropolitan area residents. In the top panel, the dependent variable is the speed that workers commute at measured in miles per hour. I estimate equation (1). Speed = constant + b 1 *log(MSA Population) + b 2 *(Distance to CBD) + b 3 *1(Commute using Public Transit) + U
The standard errors are clustered by metro area. A doubling of a metro area's population is associated with a reduction of speed of 1.6 miles per hour. For every extra mile that a household lives from the CBD, its commuting speed increases by .44 miles per hour.
The third column shows how slow public transit is. People in big cities are more likely to commute using public transit and this increases their commute times. All else equal, a worker who commutes using public transit travels 11 miles per hour slower than a worker who commutes by car. Public transit use explains 25% of the big city speed penalty. In the middle panel of Table One , I report estimates of equation (2).
Commute Time = constant + b 1 *log(MSA Population) + b 2 *(Distance to CBD) + b 3 *1(Commute using Public Transit) + U
A doubling of metro size increases the average one way commute time by 2 minutes. Public transit use in big cities explains half of this relationship. The average public transit user's commute is 23 minutes longer than the average car commuter's.
Controlling for city size and distance to work, commute times are shorter for people who live further from the CBD.
To one is for workers who live in metropolitan areas with more than four million people and one is for workers who live in metropolitan areas with less than four million people. The average line highlights that average commute times rise with distance from the CBD. As expected, the big cities have higher commute times. At seven miles from the CBD, the average commute time in big cities is roughly 12 minutes longer one way than in small cities. But, note the convergence! Commute times in big city decline sharply from seven miles to the CBD out to 20 miles to the CBD. In contrast, average commute times rise in smaller cities over this same mileage interval.
One simple explanation for these facts is that employment decentralization in major cities has allowed suburbanites who work in the suburbs to enjoy shorter commutes. Firm fragmentation has reduced the number of workers at the corporate downtown headquarters and increased the number of "back office" jobs to the suburbs To further study, the demand for living in one of the four categories reported in Table Two , I estimate Engel curves. For each of these four dummies, I estimate the following linear probability model where the unit of analysis is person j in metropolitan area m.
Dummy jm = Φ m + b 1 *age j + b 2 *age*age j + f(household income) + U
I specify f() to be a quartic. For each of the four dependent variables, I estimate (3) and holding age at its sample mean predict how the share of household heads for who the dependent variable equals one varies with household income. Note that these categories are not mutually exclusive and thus do not need to add up to one.
In Figure Six , I report the predicted share/income relationships for all metropolitan areas. For the ten largest metro areas, I have also re-estimated equation (3) and made new predictions. These are presented in Figure In Figure Eight , I report one last set of facts for the ten largest metropolitan areas.
I report the share of households who live in single detached homes who have long commutes (45 minutes or longer) by distance from the Central Business District. I also report the share of households whose household head has a short commute and I also report the shares of household heads who live in new housing (built between 1980 and 2000) and have a short commute. Ten miles from the CBD, roughly 17% of the sample live in a detached home and have a short commute to work while roughly 8% of the sample live in a detached home and have a long commute to work. It is interesting to note that over the range of 10 miles to 20 miles to the CBD that the four lines are roughly parallel. In contrast to the monocentric model, increases in distance to the CBD lead to a rising share of households with a long commute and a short commute.
Urban Pollution Progress
Water and air pollution has been a second set of major external cost of living in big cities. The scale effects of concentrating millions of people into a small geographical area created major public health problems. At the turn of the 20 th century, the average white urbanite paid a ten year "mortality penalty" for not living in the countryside (Haines 2001) . By 1940, this mortality premium had vanished. Both cross-city research Miller 2004, Cain and Rotella 2001) and city specific case studies such as Ferrie and Troesken's (2004) investigation of Chicago highlight the importance of large scale water treatment infrastructure in reducing death from water borne disease.
1 These investments helped to reduce the public health costs of urban density. Using data for 31
Philadelphia Wards, Condran and Cheney (1982) find that tuberculosis and pneumonia death rates were higher in 1880 in wards with higher population density. These coefficient estimates are borderline statistically significant. Based on their ward estimates from 1930, Condran and Cheney (1982) find that the population density effect on death rates from these diseases shrinks sharply.
In recent years, major cities have experienced large water quality gains (see http://www.epa.gov/owm/wquality/benefits.htm). In New York City, people are fishing in its rivers again and wild creatures such as beavers are spotting swimming in its waters.
The media is celebrating the pollution progress in major rivers such as Boston's Charles 
As shown in Table Three, Big city deindustrialization has helped to improve urban air quality. 4 For counties that had at least 250,000 people in 1969 the average share of manufacturing declined from 21.9% to 10.6% in the year 2000. The results in Table Three provide I test whether b<0. In Table Four , I report regressions where the unit of analysis is a zip code. The sample includes all zip codes within 25 miles of 297 different metropolitan area CBDs. Controlling for a metro area fixed effect and a zip code's land area (a dart board measure), I test whether the probability that a noxious site is present is lower further from the CBD. In column (7) of Table Two , I document that the probably that a TRI site is located in a zip code declines by 1.5 percentage points for each mile of distance from the CBD. In column (8), I show that the probability that there is at least one superfund site in a zip code declines by 1 percentage point for each mile of distance from the CBD.
While suburbanization reduces the average urbanite's exposure to local public bads, it increases the likelihood that this person consumes more energy resources. Low density, car centered living increases gasoline consumption by around 30% relative to living and working in more compact cities and living in multifamily housing units (Bento et. al , Kahn 2000) . Suburbanites are likely to consume more electricity as they live in larger homes. Given the current absence of a carbon tax, the typical household ignores its greenhouse gas contribution in its own pursuit of high quality of life.
Crime
Crime is a key urban disamenity. Big city crime rates are higher than smaller cities (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999) . Crime and poverty go hand in hand. Given that the poor are over-represented in center cities and often do not have access to cars, crime is concentrated in urban neighborhoods and other neighborhoods that can accessed using public transit (Bowes and Ihlandfelt 2001 , Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport 2007 , Brueckner and Rosenthal 2007 . Crime has declined in big cities starting in the early 1990s. The relative importance of abortion, lead, crack cocaine, police hires, and incapacitation in explaining this trend continue to be debated (Levitt 2004 , Reyes 2007 ).
To present some new results on crime and urban density, I focus on counties that 
In estimating equation (7) 
IV. Urban Housing Price and Quantity Dynamics Caused By Improved Quality of Life
If a city experiences reductions in crime, pollution and congestion, then demand to live there will rise. The elasticity of housing supply is thus a key determinant of whether prices or quantities adjust in response. Consider a city where it is easy to build new housing because the regulatory tax is low (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks 2005) . In such an elastic housing supply city (think of Riverside and San Bernardino, Los Angeles), new housing will be built, population growth will take place. As the population grows, average commute times could rise and pollution levels could rise. In the new compensating differentials equilibrium, the city will feature more people but relatively little home price appreciation (see . In contrast, in an inelastic housing supply city such as San Francisco or New York City, improved quality of life will translate into rising home prices.
Could improvements in local quality of life fuel the rise of "Superstar cities"? Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai's (2006) emphasize the combination of inelastic supply and the rising skewness of the income distribution. As the count of the wealthy increases, they bid up the price of the scarce set of housing units in certain desirable cities. A complementary hypothesis is that the rich's willingness to pay for living a specific city increases as its amenities increase. As prices rise in San Francisco and New York City, the average entrant has more education than the average person who is "priced out" of this city. This gentrification process raises the city's overall average education level.
Rising city human capital levels offer the potential for social spillover benefits in terms of productivity effects (Moretti 2004) . In a gentrifying city, the commercial and cuisine opportunities upgrade as restaurants and stores that cater to these groups appear (Waldfogel 2007) . The net effect of this "virtuous cycle" is even higher home prices.
Home owners in such cities will benefit from this process while renters could actually be made worse off by amenity improvements that trigger gentrification (Sieg et. al. 2004 ).
Future work could investigate the general equilibrium effects introduced by amenity
improvements in an open city model where demographic groups face different cross-city migration costs (Bayer, Keohane, Timmins 2006, Chay and Greenstone 2005) .
V. Conclusion
Congestion, pollution and crime represent three major quality of life challenges that big city residents face. This paper has used several data sets to optimistically argue that significant quality of life progress has taken place in large metropolitan areas in recent years. Big city pollution and crime problems have fallen sharply in the United
States in the recent past.
While high profile studies such as the Texas Transportation Institute's Urban
Morbility report paint a gloomy picture of how much time urbanites spend "stuck in traffic", such macro studies mask significant within city heterogeneity with respect to commute time progress. As employment has suburbanized, many people who live ten to twenty miles from the city center now have short commutes.
Suburbanization causes households to be able to drive at higher speeds, and be exposed to less local pollution and crime risk. The net effect of declining commute times, pollution and crime in big cities is a reduction in the cost of urban agglomeration.
Optimal city size grows as the marginal cost of city bigness declines. This paper's evidence has all been based on U.S data but the findings may speak to mega city growth around the world. As mega cities grow in developing countries how much does urban quality of life decline? Similar to the U.S experience at the turn of the 20 th century, the negative quality of life consequences of living in a growing city hinges on whether government has the resources (Cutler and Miller 2004) and the incentives to provide necessary pubic infrastructure and regulation. .6
This table is based on year 2000 IPUMS micro data. This figure is based on four separate linear probability models based on equation (3) in the text.. For example, the category "Detach, Long Commute" represents the probability that a household commutes by private car, lives in a single detached house and has a one way commute time of 45 minutes or longer. This figure is based on results using all metropolitan areas and holding the household head's age at the sample mean. This table is based on year 2000 IPUMS micro data. This figure is based on four separate linear probability models. For example, the category "Detach, Long Commute" represents the probability that a household commutes by private car, lives in a single detached house and has a one way commute time of 45 minutes or longer. This figure is based on results using only households who live in the ten largest metropolitan areas. In this figure, the household head's age is held constant at the sample mean. This table is based on year 2000 IPUMS micro data. The category "Detach, Long Commute" represents the probability that a household commutes by private car, lives in a single detached house and has a one way commute time of 45 minutes or longer. The category "Detach, Short Commute" represents the probability that a household commutes by private car, lives in a single detached house and has a one way commute time of 25 minutes or shorter. The category "new" represents household heads who live in a home that was built between 1980 and 2000. This figure is based on results using only households who live in the ten largest metropolitan areas. N=1242; at least 25,000 people in 1969 (5) and (6) in the text. In columns (7) and (8), I report linear probability models where the unit of analysis is a zip code. These regressions include the zip code's total land area as a control. The sample includes all residential zip codes that are within 30 miles of a CBD. In columns (1) through (6), the sample includes all monitoring stations within 30 miles of a CBD in metropolitan area that has at least 500,000 people. The unit of analysis is a county/year. The sample includes all counties between 1994 and 2002 for the subset of counties that are part of a metro area. The omitted category is a suburban county in a metropolitan area.
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